Leadership and Supervision Issues in Nathaniel Philbrick’s In the Heart of the Sea Essay

Nathaniel Philbricks In the heart and soul of the sea describes the tragic final sail of the Nantucket- found colossusr Essex in 1820. The Essex was a floating factory, a comparatively sm every(prenominal) however sturdy vas designed to travel great distances to find, kill, and process whales, thus yielding the exceedingly valuable whale oil and separate products. In the Heart of the sea also describes a series of errors, mishaps and miscalculationsoften with fatal resultsin the management, leadership and supervision of the enterprise.These events, despite the distance in time, provide scenarios to compargon and differentiate present-day c formerlypts of leadership and supervision. The story of the Essex illustrates numerous instances of (a) pitiful prep beforehand and during the journey, (b) poor staffing purposes before and during the journey, (c) indecisive and/or poor leadership and (d) poor supervision which contributed to the difficult journey, the sinking of the Essex and the horrible aftermath. Typical of the practices of the era and locale, Essex was captained, but non featureed and provisioned, by a swing outor-officer who had risen through the ranks.This would be the first command voyage of Captain George Pollard, Jr. By exclusively accounts he had successfully risen to beginning Mate of the Essex on precedent voyages and was given up captaincy when the former captain was given a newer and larger vessel. Unfortunately he inherited a worn ship curtly to be out of commission. Accordingly the owners spent as little as possible on repairs of the vessel and even less on provide for the multi-year cruise. thither is no indication Pollard had both input in both decision.As this was his first command he was likely to go forward in his employers good graces and refrain from insisting on better repairs and outfitting. To boost compound these initial as authenticly as future problems was the mesh payment structure in which Pollard and the crew were essentially operative on commission. Payment to officers and seamen alike would be a portion found on rank and seniority paid that if the valuable whale oil was safely in port. Other experienced captains had the ability and picking to add to the original provisions.Pollard either tryd to set sail despite the meager provisions or was otiose to supplement them by his own means. This system strongly contrasts to management practices of the day as well as contemporary practices. Owner-operated businesses were not at all un greenness in the era with a strong active style of leadership. Most bang would be the owner-operated vessels with a captain well-versed on ship maintenance and outfitting. manifestly today anyone would be considered naive at best and insane at worst to harbour on such a logistical caper of any sort without having been given decision-making authority.Today even with companies having distant or publicly held ownership the leadership and decision-makers of the confederacy atomic number 18 urged to buy into the company in the backbone of making decisions and leading in a mode consistent with actual ownership. If Pollard can be forgive to well-nigh extent for the poor decision-making at home port, the dark lack of planning during his maiden voyage is his burden alone. afterwards almost loosing his ship closely at the onset of the voyage he is either unable or incapable of tactical or strategic planning when the Essex is destroyed.With a antecedently damaged vessel prudence would dictate some sort of fortuity plan short of a belief that lightening exit not strike the same place twice. While the Essex was sinking it was the foresight of others who managed to preserve essential items. Some decisions defied common sense. Instead of cooking and preparing a substantial amount of available turtle meat he simply position two live turtles with each surviving whaleboat. perhaps Pollard did not think the unthinkabl e could happen again. Such planning and preparedness is not something novel, for his era or ours.It is simply the ability to survive the unexpected and the sapience to learn from it. Contemporary leadership in management, government, and virtually any other field must be prepared for the unexpected. The unexpected and the disastrous provide surely occur, usually when least(prenominal) expected. It then also becomes a larn experience for leadership to plan and think for the unplanned and unthinkable. invariable with the idea of poor or non-existent planning was the Nantucket concept of staffing vessels with the unskilled.Pollards ship was manned by a significant number of sailor boys who had neer lived in Nantucket nor experienced life on a whaler. Other sailors include inexperienced Nantucket youngsters anxious for their first cruise as well as officers sailing in newly-promoted ranks. It was expected of Pollard and his officers to essentially conduct on-the-job training for the unskilled staff. However, once again, if Pollard can be excused for having to deal with something out of his control, the staffing decisions made during the disaster were his alone.Most glaring was the decision regarding the placement of the survivors in what would become their lifeboats. No consideration was given to skill, ability or health. Instead, it was a system based on whether a sailor was black or white, Nantucketer or not. Apprenticeships and on-the-job training are senile practices dating screening centuries and still valid today. Both systems are based on both a lengthy or at least sufficient period of time and a non-critical or at least supervised situation. The apprentice or OJT worker lead make mistakes and is given the opportunity to make them and learn from them in a controlled situation. once skilled, the staffing manakin must be developed to bear on whatever turnout or quality standard is to be met. In an emergency situation such decisions must be made b y leadership without being distrait by foreshadowless issues of race, class, or place of birth. Again, Pollard can be shielded to some extent by the customs and practices of his day. Contemporary leaders bring no such excuse. Decision-making is often made in the alone(predicate) vacuum of sole command, something that Pollard, at times, was unable or willing to do. leaders by consensus was not something he fucking, but he did indeed practice.Additionally, perplexity is in fact a decision, and one that eats time. After the initial near-fatal keeling of his ship Pollard commits both errors he abdicates sole leadership, procrastinates, reverses himself, and by stressful to lead by consensus ultimately leads his ship to disaster. Again, forces work against Pollard. To turn back with a damaged empty ship would result in no wages and possibly a loss of command. By deciding to gallop the voyage with a damaged ship, lost(p) provisions, and lost whaleboats Pollard was not talking a c alculated risk, he was essentially dooming his ship and crew to disaster.Modern management case studies abound with the disastrous stories of managers failing to decide and having that activity yield worse results than a bad decision. Most missions are time-critical and while many, if not most missions can have a entire method of correcting erroneous decisions there is no method for reversing time lost in indecision. The texts are equally full of the horror stories of leaders who take the ahead at all costs attitude without a real appraisal of whether their ship can handle the journey.This inevitably results in the learned experience that profitability at all costs is very unprofitable. After the sinking of the Essex a variety of decisions were made, some based on common sense, or lack of same, and others based on the nautical knowledge of the time. Perhaps the most glaring was the decision to allow the surviving whaleboats to operate in an individual fashion, without tying togeth er during the night. While a questionable glide decision, it casts some light on broader contemporary issues.During critical situations, whether a production run or a full-scale emergency it is common sense and a practical necessity to maintain communication and command. Failure to maintain either can jeopardize the personnel and the mission. In the Heart of the Sea is filled with numerous examples of poor supervision. From the very onset there is no indication Pollard really supervised the repair and provisioning of his vessel it all likelihood he delegated a great deal of this righteousness to his First and Second Mate. There is no indication he did a thorough, hands-on investigation of his damaged vessel after the initial near-sinking.Once whaling he was out in a whaleboat, as was the custom, instead of being in a position on deck to supervise all of the events that would unfold. There is no indication he personally undertook a surveillance of Henderson Island to square up if it could sustain the crew, or in the alternative, if it could better provision the survivors on their continue voyage. During many of the catastrophic events Pollard seemed overwhelmed and incapacitated by the situation. He was unable to command and supervise what can only be described as life-threatening or life-saving activity unfolding in front of him.Once all was lost he decided to allow the boats to go their own way, and was unable to maintain the supervision of survivors when that was his most critical duty. Throughout the disastrous journey the questionable command of Pollard is and will be debated. What is certain is there was considerable doubt at the time that he exercised the decision-making responsibilities in a prudent manner. The captain of a ship and the leader of a corporation must be able to face a situation, whether mundane or critical, and make very quick and decisive actions.First and initiative is the decision of whether to take a hands on approach or delegate responsibility. There is no easy or set answer, and either method can be disastrous, if a leader usurps a dependants better command of a situation or if responsibility is delegated to someone incapable of handling the situation. However, the command of a ship is remarkable and very similar to many organizational situations in that the leader at the very top is expected to be well-versed and capable of every form in the entire organization.If that is not the case, then the leader must have a clear understanding of his personal abilities and limitations as well as that of all of the subordinates in the chain of command. Throughout the narratives and accounts which the book is comprised of there is keep of, and no doubt that the captain knew his ship better than anyone. However, it became very axiomatic at the onset that his knowledge of his and his officers capabilities was suspect. At only one point was Pollard described as acting with the authority and decisiveness commonly re quired of a ships captain.He quickly and fiercely responded to an early protest by the crew relating to what they considered poor rations. His outburst and threaten action quelled the protest and certainly left the crew with no doubt of his intent. However, what is missing is the not-unusual comments and attitude from crewmen indicating make do respect of their captain and their willingness to dramatise his commands, regardless of outcome, because of their knowledge of him and his ability.It is imperative upon leaders to not just know their workplace, but to know their staff. It is not enough to go ballistic once in a while to let the staff know what will happen if something is discovered amiss or in response to what style is not to be tolerated. Command through intimidation is foolhardy what is indispensable of leadership is to prove competency to staff and subordinates to the point where there is no doubt there is respect in the leaders ability.At that point leadership becom es natural if and when the staff and subordinates believe the leadership will in fact lead, but do so in a manner that takes into account the well-being, if not excerption, of all. In modern society survival is often stinting survival, and depending on the organization or industry economic survival must be paramount in managements priorities. Pollard lost on both counts the voyage was a complete economic disaster and resulted in the deaths of the majority of his crew. The journey was a voyage of poor planning, staffing, decision-making and supervision.It is an epic of missed opportunities and unrealistic goals. It is a blueprint for any manager or leader in what not to do. Leadership cannot break to be unprepared in any of the areas noted above. Each act and influence the other, often in ways unanticipated and noted only too late. It is easy, but very necessary to look at situations with twenty-twenty hindsight if lessons are to be learned and errors prevented in the future. Ther e is a host of what-if questions presented by In the Heart of the Sea which every leader should take to heart.